Speaker
Tamay Besiroglu
Guest on Dwarkesh Podcast. 210 claims across 1 episode, Apr 2025.
210claims, each timestamped
1 of 12signals on the brief
0verified changes of mind
36open predictions
Positions over time
Every pair of statements that was compared. Only a verified change counts as a change of mind; rewording, added nuance and different questions do not.
No two statements by this speaker have been compared yet.
Predictions
As stated. A window appears only where the speaker gave one.
| Expects | By | Said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| The speaker expects very smart AI systems to be one among many factors behind a transition and acceleration in growth and technological change. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The speaker would move the forecast for AI to perform literally all remote work later by about five years, or possibly by 20 years. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI may need long-horizon coherence, agency and autonomy, and human-like multimodal understanding to match human capabilities broadly or across remote-work tasks. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Analyses of energy and GPU-production constraints suggest that perhaps three or four orders of magnitude of compute scaling remain. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Unlocking additional AI capabilities might require substantially more compute scaling. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI agency may eventually look easy in retrospect, although achieving it could require years of difficult complementary innovations, hardware improvements, and scaling. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| OpenAI will reach $100 billion in revenue by the end of the relevant period, with the speaker estimating roughly a 40% chance. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI systems are expected to make substantial progress on tasks that humans find impressive. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Overall algorithmic efficiency may not grow hyperbolically or faster than exponentially, according to imperfect estimates from AI and other software, even assuming experiments are not especially important. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| If AGI arrives in 2027, the speaker assigns a quite high probability to a software-only singularity occurring. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Wages could remain very high for a while for workers who find suitable jobs after any displacement or transition. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Some workers may be displaced by AI-driven labor changes and may need to transition to find a suitable job. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Tamay Besiroglu thinks the gains from owning capital might be enormous. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| People who own housing or have 401(k)s would benefit enormously from broad automation and AI deployment. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Tamay Besiroglu thinks broad AI deployment could receive deep support even while radically changing labor markets and the skills and occupations in demand. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Tamay Besiroglu thinks countries that are more permissive of AI deployment might be less liberal in other respects, and that less liberal arrangements might function better under broad AI deployment. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The UAE may prioritize creating an environment conducive to AI deployment, as an illustrative example of a place whose norms do so. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Societies might adopt norms that are not classically liberal but are more conducive to AI functioning and producing value. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| If AI could gain substantial value by dominating and taking over humans, the outcome might instead be a negotiated settlement. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI’s economic and decision-making importance could gradually and peacefully increase, potentially benefiting humans through access to a larger economy and more advanced technology and making concerns about an AI takeover less serious. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Accelerating human change could increase the dominance of some values and the influence of people who discount the future less, since they save more and make good investments. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Accelerating human change could cause the loss of many things people value. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Technological maturity would slow change and growth, and some things might become more locked in compared with the preceding period. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| SPEAKER_01 expects the technological change from today to technological maturity to be orders of magnitude greater than the technological change from the 1500s to today. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The AI transition will be diffuse across many organizations and companies, and shaped more by economic forces than by idiosyncratic preferences or lasting founder effects. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| An embargo could become plausible when AI demonstrates much of its capabilities and power. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI systems attain superhuman capabilities, as the speaker expects. In a cluster of 15 → | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The world could experience drastic acceleration without any AI system being better than humans at every task. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| An AI system superior to humans at every task might produce no acceleration if it is very expensive or slow. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The speaker expects AI systems to be highly diverse and considers it not very meaningful to ask where humans stand in relation to them as a group. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Humans will remain unable to understand many things, including aspects of how the world works and how things are made. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The speaker expects future consumption growth to come importantly, and perhaps more importantly, from expanding the range of goods and services people consume rather than only increasing quantities of existing products. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Under the stated assumptions, an H100 running human-brain software could pay for itself in roughly a year, suggesting an economic doubling time of about a year. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| The speaker expects explosive economic growth once AI can flexibly substitute for humans. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| Central planning might work somewhat better in an AI-driven economy, with much greater communication bandwidth than exists today as one possible reason. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
| AI systems could use peripheral sensors mainly to collect data and process it centrally, and centralization might benefit from GPU-driven economies of scale, better models, and deeper analysis. | no date given | 17 Apr 2025 | pending |
Appearances
Claims per episode
- 17 Apr 2025AGI is still 30 years away — Ege Erdil & Tamay BesirogluDwarkesh Podcast · guest