What I learned about power from LBJ and Robert Moses

“So I recently interviewed Robert Caro. He spent the last 50 years writing a four-volume biography of Lyndon Johnson, and he spent another seven years before that writing the biography of Robert Moses, who was a master builder of New York.”

Claim: Robert Caro spent 50 years writing a four-volume biography of Lyndon Johnson and seven additional years writing a biography of Robert Moses.

“So I recently interviewed Robert Caro. He spent the last 50 years writing a four-volume biography of Lyndon Johnson, and he spent another seven years before that writing the biography of Robert Moses, who was a master builder of New York.”

Claim: Robert Moses was a master builder of New York.

“His books are widely regarded as the best explorations of political power that have ever been written, and they also happen to be literally my favorite books ever.”

Claim: Robert Caro's books are widely regarded as the best explorations of political power ever written.

“His books are widely regarded as the best explorations of political power that have ever been written, and they also happen to be literally my favorite books ever.”

Claim: The speaker considers Robert Caro's books their favorite books of all time.

“Whenever I meet somebody new, one of the first questions that they often ask me is, "Who's the person you most wanna interview that you haven't yet?" And for six years, I've answered that question in the same way: Robert Caro.”

Claim: For six years, the speaker consistently named Robert Caro as the person they most wanted to interview but had not yet interviewed.

“And I've actually spent a lot of time trying to make this interview happen. I've chased down his agent, I've called his publisher, I've contacted the museums which are hosting his archives.”

Claim: The speaker made sustained efforts to arrange an interview with Robert Caro by contacting Caro's agent, publisher, and museums hosting his archives.

“I've even sent him handwritten letters. I finally got to sit down with him, and I'm very happy with how it turned out. It'll be out tomorrow. In the meantime, as I was preparing for this interview and I was rereading all of these biographies, I was writing down all the lessons that they laid out about how to accumulate and use power, and this video essay is the result.”

Claim: The speaker sent Robert Caro handwritten letters and eventually sat down for an interview with him.

“I've even sent him handwritten letters. I finally got to sit down with him, and I'm very happy with how it turned out. It'll be out tomorrow. In the meantime, as I was preparing for this interview and I was rereading all of these biographies, I was writing down all the lessons that they laid out about how to accumulate and use power, and this video essay is the result.”

Claim: The speaker was very happy with the outcome of the interview with Robert Caro.

“I've even sent him handwritten letters. I finally got to sit down with him, and I'm very happy with how it turned out. It'll be out tomorrow. In the meantime, as I was preparing for this interview and I was rereading all of these biographies, I was writing down all the lessons that they laid out about how to accumulate and use power, and this video essay is the result.”

Claim: While preparing for the Robert Caro interview, the speaker reread the biographies and recorded their lessons about how to accumulate and use power.

“He built more of the physical city than anybody before or since. He built the Triborough and Verrazzano Bridges, the Cross Bronx Expressway, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, Shea Stadium, two giant power dams upstate, in addition to hundreds of parks and pools.”

Claim: Robert Moses built the Triborough and Verrazzano Bridges, the Cross Bronx Expressway, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, Shea Stadium, two large power dams upstate, and hundreds of parks and pools.

“He built more of the physical city than anybody before or since. He built the Triborough and Verrazzano Bridges, the Cross Bronx Expressway, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, Shea Stadium, two giant power dams upstate, in addition to hundreds of parks and pools.”

Claim: Robert Moses built more of New York City's physical infrastructure than anyone before or after him.

“Of the 899 miles of highways completed in New York State by 1964, Moses had built 672 of them.”

Claim: By 1964, Robert Moses had built 672 of the 899 highway miles completed in New York State.

“His projects collectively cost hundreds of billions of dollars in today's money. For more than 30 years, Robert Moses was the most powerful person in New York, more powerful than any elected mayor or governor, despite the fact that he was not elected to anything.”

Claim: Robert Moses's projects had a combined cost equivalent to hundreds of billions of dollars in today's money.

“His projects collectively cost hundreds of billions of dollars in today's money. For more than 30 years, Robert Moses was the most powerful person in New York, more powerful than any elected mayor or governor, despite the fact that he was not elected to anything.”

Claim: For more than 30 years, Robert Moses was more powerful in New York than any elected mayor or governor, although he held no elected office.

“How did he get that much power, and how did he keep it? Part of the answer is that Moses wrote the laws that governed him. He was called the best bill drafter in Albany, and he used that skill to write himself powers that the legislators voting on his bills didn't know that they were granting.”

Claim: Robert Moses used his bill-drafting skill to write laws that governed him and to give himself powers that legislators voting on his bills did not know they were granting.

“The political genius of Robert Moses is perhaps best illustrated by his use of public authorities. These are government-created corporations that build city infrastructure.”

Claim: Public authorities are corporations created by government to build city infrastructure.

“Public authorities sell bonds to pay for a specific project, say, a new bridge. Once the bridge is built, the authority would charge drivers a toll until it had collected enough money to pay off its bonds.”

Claim: Public authorities finance specific infrastructure projects by selling bonds and collecting tolls until the bonds are repaid.

“Then the authority would tear down the toll booths, hand the bridge over to the city, and go out of existence.”

Claim: Under the original model, a public authority would dissolve after repaying its bonds, transferring the completed bridge to the city and ending toll collection.

“At least, that was the idea, and that's what Albany assumed would happen when the New York State Congress approved the Triborough Bridge Authority Act of 1933, whose final version included, buried within pages and pages of legalese, a few seemingly minor alterations that were drafted by Robert Moses.”

Claim: When approving the Triborough Bridge Authority Act of 1933, Albany assumed the authority would dissolve once its bonds were repaid.

“Now, Section 1 of this act clearly stated that the authority would dissolve once the bonds were paid off. And since the bonds could run at most 40 years and the revenues from the bridge would pay back the initial cost far sooner, it seemed like the authority had a clear built-in expiry date.”

Claim: Section 1 of the Triborough Bridge Authority Act required the authority to dissolve after its bonds were repaid.

“Now, Section 1 of this act clearly stated that the authority would dissolve once the bonds were paid off. And since the bonds could run at most 40 years and the revenues from the bridge would pay back the initial cost far sooner, it seemed like the authority had a clear built-in expiry date.”

Claim: The bonds had a maximum term of 40 years, while bridge revenues were expected to repay the initial cost substantially sooner.

“However, in a subsection of Section 9, Moses added a single sentence that said that the authority could, quote, "From time to time," end quote, pay off its old bonds by issuing new ones.”

Claim: Robert Moses added a provision allowing the authority to refinance old bonds by issuing new bonds from time to time.

“And those new ones could be, quote, "for any other corporate purpose," end quote. So just before the original bonds were about to expire, the authority now had the right to issue a totally fresh 40-year note for a potentially totally different use.”

Claim: The provision allowed the authority, near the expiration of its original bonds, to issue new bonds with a term of up to 40 years for any corporate purpose, potentially unrelated to the original project.

“And what could the authority build with all this money? Well, the original act let it build two bridges and their approaches.”

Claim: The original Triborough Bridge Authority Act authorized the authority to build two bridges and their approaches.

“Triborough's chairman, Robert Moses, called this project more than a mere bridge. "It will be," he said, "an immense artery of travel in the very heart of the city."”

Claim: Robert Moses characterized the Triborough project as an immense urban travel artery, not merely a bridge.

“Moses' amendments also gave this authority the right to build connecting roads and, quote, "facilities not inconsistent with the use of the project," end quote.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s amendments authorized the Triborough Authority to build connecting roads and facilities consistent with the project’s use.

“These rights, when interpreted as creatively as Moses intended to, would allow Moses to alter most of the roads, parks, and housing in New York.”

Claim: Robert Moses intended a creative interpretation of the Triborough Authority’s rights to permit him to alter most of New York’s roads, parks, and housing.

“For if a road connected to a road which connected to a road which connected to the bridge, or if a park lay along the road that connected to the road that connected to the road that connected to the bridge, surely the Triborough Authority was entitled to improve and change it.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s interpretation was that the Triborough Authority could improve or change roads and parks connected to its bridge by a chain of roads.

“All this construction cost could be financed by the bridge's enormous toll revenues and the right of the Triborough Authority to borrow against them.”

Claim: The Triborough Authority could finance construction with bridge toll revenues and by borrowing against those revenues.

“To give some perspective, in 1946, the entire New York City government could only borrow $150 million before hitting its legal debt limit.”

Claim: In 1946, New York City government’s borrowing capacity before its legal debt limit was $150 million.

“That very same year, Triborough could borrow $360 million. So Moses's Bridge Authority had access to more than double the amount of money as the largest city in America.”

Claim: In 1946, the Triborough Authority could borrow $360 million, more than twice New York City government’s $150 million borrowing limit.

“Moses had planned for this, too, and his solution was so clever that no lawyer or lawmaker in Albany saw it coming. The United States Constitution says that no state shall make, quote, "any law impairing the obligation of contracts," end quote, entered into by a government entity.”

Claim: The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from enacting laws that impair contractual obligations entered into by government entities.

“A bond issued by a public authority is such a contract. Moses snuck a clause into the act which allowed him to add, quote, "any other matters of like or different character, which in any way affect the security or protection of the bonds," end quote, into these bond contracts.”

Claim: Robert Moses inserted a clause allowing additional matters affecting bond security or protection to be included in the bond contracts.

“A bond issued by a public authority is such a contract. Moses snuck a clause into the act which allowed him to add, quote, "any other matters of like or different character, which in any way affect the security or protection of the bonds," end quote, into these bond contracts.”

Claim: A bond issued by a public authority constitutes a contract.

“And these matters included that Triborough could charge whatever tolls it wanted and for however long they wanted, and they could keep the surplus thus generated.”

Claim: The Triborough Authority’s bond terms allowed it to set tolls at any level and for any duration, and to retain the resulting surplus.

“That is to say Moses could now entrench his powers simply by writing them into the bonds that he issued. From the moment that those bonds were sold, those powers could no longer be revoked by the legislature or by the governor or by the mayor, by anything, in fact, short of a constitutional convention.”

Claim: Robert Moses could make his powers effectively irrevocable by embedding them in issued bonds; after issuance, only a constitutional convention could revoke them.

“The powers that Moses now had were guaranteed for the bond's entire lifetime, a lifetime which could always be extended simply by refinancing.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s powers were guaranteed for the full lifetime of the bonds, and refinancing could extend that lifetime.

“These bond covenants had turned Triborough Authority's powers into granite, but nothing in them guaranteed that Robert Moses would remain its chairman.”

Claim: Triborough Authority bond covenants entrenched the authority’s powers but did not ensure Robert Moses would remain chairman.

“So with just a few minor tweaks, Moses had turned an act meant to allow for the construction of two bridges into the basis of an institution that could build basically anything it wanted anywhere in New York, and whose authority to do so was protected by the United States Constitution.”

Claim: Robert Moses transformed an act intended to authorize two bridges into the basis for a constitutionally protected institution with power to build essentially anything anywhere in New York.

“So how did Moses retain this position for 30 years? Part of the answer is, again, the law. Moses drafted the Triborough Act so that its commissioners could be removed midterm only on, quote, "stated charges after a formal hearing," end quote.”

Claim: The Triborough Act, drafted by Robert Moses, allowed commissioners to be removed midterm only on stated charges after a formal hearing.

“But any differences he had with the mayor or governor were more about what he decided to build and whom he displaced to build it rather than his personal conduct. As Caro himself writes, quote, "Robert Moses was not himself corrupt. He was, in fact, as uninterested in obtaining payoffs for himself as any public servant who ever lived. In the politician's phrase, he was money honest," end quote.”

Claim: Robert Caro characterized Robert Moses as not personally corrupt.

“But any differences he had with the mayor or governor were more about what he decided to build and whom he displaced to build it rather than his personal conduct. As Caro himself writes, quote, "Robert Moses was not himself corrupt.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s conflicts with mayors and governors were about his construction decisions and displacement of people, not his personal conduct.

“He was, in fact, as uninterested in obtaining payoffs for himself as any public servant who ever lived. In the politician's phrase, he was money honest," end quote.”

Claim: Robert Caro described Robert Moses as exceptionally uninterested in personal payoffs and as “money honest.”

“So there were never any formal charges to bring. But this only explains why he wasn't fired in the middle of his term. Why was he reappointed every six years? Well, at his peak, Moses was a hydra with a dozen heads.”

Claim: No formal charges were brought against Robert Moses.

“He held 12 different government posts at the same time: city construction coordinator, chairman of the State Council of Parks, chairman of the State Power Authority, and so on.”

Claim: At his peak, Robert Moses simultaneously held 12 government posts.

“Some of these positions were appointed by the mayor, some of them by the governor, and so no single person could cut off the head simultaneously. And removing him from any one position meant that you were making an enemy with the man who would still be the most powerful person in New York.”

Claim: Removing Robert Moses from any one post risked making an enemy of him while he remained New York’s most powerful person.

“Some of these positions were appointed by the mayor, some of them by the governor, and so no single person could cut off the head simultaneously. And removing him from any one position meant that you were making an enemy with the man who would still be the most powerful person in New York.”

Claim: Because Robert Moses’s government posts were appointed by different officials, no single mayor or governor could remove him from all posts simultaneously.

“More importantly, no mayor or governor wanted to fire him. The way we remember Robert Moses today is based on a reputation that was calcified in the 1970s when The Power Broker came out and when New York was experiencing a dark age of crime, deindustrialization, and white flight.”

Claim: No mayor or governor wanted to fire Robert Moses.

“More importantly, no mayor or governor wanted to fire him. The way we remember Robert Moses today is based on a reputation that was calcified in the 1970s when The Power Broker came out and when New York was experiencing a dark age of crime, deindustrialization, and white flight.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s modern reputation solidified in the 1970s amid the publication of The Power Broker and New York’s period of crime, deindustrialization, and white flight.

“Moses got much of the blame for this. After all, the subtitle of The Power Broker is Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. But in my opinion, this crisis had more to do with larger structural factors that had nothing to do with Moses himself.”

Claim: The speaker believes New York’s crisis was driven more by larger structural factors unrelated to Robert Moses than by Moses himself.

“Cities that he had nothing to do with, like Detroit and St. Louis, experienced a much more dramatic collapse. For the vast majority of his career, Moses was incredibly popular.”

Claim: Robert Moses was extremely popular for the vast majority of his career.

“Cities that he had nothing to do with, like Detroit and St. Louis, experienced a much more dramatic collapse. For the vast majority of his career, Moses was incredibly popular.”

Claim: Detroit and St. Louis, cities Robert Moses had no involvement with, experienced a more dramatic collapse than New York.

“In the 1930s and 1940s, New York high schools voted Moses the most admired New Yorker. This was because he had delivered over and over again public works which millions of New Yorkers got to use and enjoy, the beaches, parks, pools.”

Claim: New York high schools voted Robert Moses the most admired New Yorker during the 1930s and 1940s.

“In the 1930s and 1940s, New York high schools voted Moses the most admired New Yorker. This was because he had delivered over and over again public works which millions of New Yorkers got to use and enjoy, the beaches, parks, pools.”

Claim: Robert Moses repeatedly delivered beaches, parks, pools, and other public works used and enjoyed by millions of New Yorkers.

“And he did so at a speed and a scale that nobody had seen before. In his first four months as the city's park commissioner, he kept crews working around the clock and finished 1,700 park renovations, and he did this all without a whiff of personal scandal.”

Claim: Robert Moses delivered public works at a previously unseen speed and scale.

“And he did so at a speed and a scale that nobody had seen before. In his first four months as the city's park commissioner, he kept crews working around the clock and finished 1,700 park renovations, and he did this all without a whiff of personal scandal.”

Claim: Robert Moses completed this work without any personal scandal.

“And he did so at a speed and a scale that nobody had seen before. In his first four months as the city's park commissioner, he kept crews working around the clock and finished 1,700 park renovations, and he did this all without a whiff of personal scandal.”

Claim: During his first four months as New York City park commissioner, Robert Moses had crews work around the clock and completed 1,700 park renovations.

“Importantly, Moses could deliver these enormous and popular public works within a timeframe that fit into a single election cycle. If the mayor gave Robert Moses the power to build something, he could expect to be standing at its ribbon cutting before he was up for re-election.”

Claim: Robert Moses could complete large, popular public works within the span of a single election cycle.

“Importantly, Moses could deliver these enormous and popular public works within a timeframe that fit into a single election cycle. If the mayor gave Robert Moses the power to build something, he could expect to be standing at its ribbon cutting before he was up for re-election.”

Claim: A mayor who authorized Robert Moses to build a project could expect it to reach its ribbon cutting before the mayor’s next re-election.

“Today, it's almost unimaginable that the government could construct big things in a year or two. For example, construction on the 2nd Avenue Subway in New York began in 1972, and the first section was opened in 2017.”

Claim: Construction on New York's Second Avenue Subway began in 1972, and the first section opened in 2017.

“Today, it's almost unimaginable that the government could construct big things in a year or two. For example, construction on the 2nd Avenue Subway in New York began in 1972, and the first section was opened in 2017.”

Claim: The speaker says it is now almost unimaginable for the government to construct large projects within one or two years.

“And just these initial two miles have cost the taxpayers $4.5 billion. A lot of the funding for public works comes from Washington.”

Claim: The initial two miles of New York's Second Avenue Subway cost taxpayers $4.5 billion.

“And just these initial two miles have cost the taxpayers $4.5 billion. A lot of the funding for public works comes from Washington.”

Claim: A large share of public-works funding comes from the federal government in Washington.

“Cities that receive the most money are the ones that have finalized their blueprints and can start breaking ground as soon as a new federal initiative is announced. Moses had the largest and best team of planners and engineers in the entire country.”

Claim: Cities with finalized project blueprints and the ability to begin construction immediately after a new federal initiative is announced receive the most funding.

“Cities that receive the most money are the ones that have finalized their blueprints and can start breaking ground as soon as a new federal initiative is announced. Moses had the largest and best team of planners and engineers in the entire country.”

Claim: Robert Moses had the country's largest and best team of planners and engineers.

“And because of that, by 1936, New York was getting one-seventh of the money that the federal government had set aside for Depression era work relief for the entire nation.”

Claim: By 1936, New York received one-seventh of the federal funding allocated to Depression-era work relief nationwide.

“And the projects that this funding was going towards were the ones chosen by Moses. If the mayor had some different idea about what should be constructed, he'd have to draw up his own plans, which he didn't have the independent technical expertise to do so.”

Claim: Robert Moses chose the projects that received the funding being discussed.

“And the projects that this funding was going towards were the ones chosen by Moses. If the mayor had some different idea about what should be constructed, he'd have to draw up his own plans, which he didn't have the independent technical expertise to do so.”

Claim: A mayor who wanted a project different from Robert Moses's would have needed to prepare independent plans, but the mayor lacked the technical expertise to do that.

“So he could either build the projects that Moses wanted to build or he could build nothing at all. Between his ability to get things done, his popularity, and his control over money, Moses had a lot of leverage, and he was not shy about using it.”

Claim: Robert Moses's ability to deliver projects, popularity, and control over funding gave him substantial leverage, which he readily used.

“So he could either build the projects that Moses wanted to build or he could build nothing at all. Between his ability to get things done, his popularity, and his control over money, Moses had a lot of leverage, and he was not shy about using it.”

Claim: The mayor's practical options were to build Robert Moses's preferred projects or build nothing.

“Far from being worried about getting fired, Moses would constantly threaten to quit whenever he didn't get his way. Under Mayor Wagner, one aide said that, quote, "It seemed like he was resigning about one thing or another about twice a day," end quote.”

Claim: An aide to Mayor Wagner said Robert Moses seemed to threaten resignation about twice a day over various matters.

“Far from being worried about getting fired, Moses would constantly threaten to quit whenever he didn't get his way. Under Mayor Wagner, one aide said that, quote, "It seemed like he was resigning about one thing or another about twice a day," end quote.”

Claim: Robert Moses regularly threatened to resign when he did not get his way and was not primarily worried about being fired.

“He threatened resignation to Mayor La Guardia so often and over such small things that La Guardia's lawyer got a stack of forms printed that read, quote, "I, Robert Moses, do hereby resign as so and so," end quote, to save Moses the trouble of writing it out every single time.”

Claim: Robert Moses threatened to resign to Mayor La Guardia so frequently and over such minor issues that La Guardia's lawyer printed resignation forms for him.

“He threatened resignation to Mayor La Guardia so often and over such small things that La Guardia's lawyer got a stack of forms printed that read, quote, "I, Robert Moses, do hereby resign as so and so," end quote, to save Moses the trouble of writing it out every single time.”

Claim: La Guardia's lawyer had forms printed with the wording “I, Robert Moses, do hereby resign as so and so” to spare Moses from writing a resignation each time.

“But behind that joke was real fear. If a mayor accepted that resignation, not only would he be forfeiting the completion of whatever projects Moses was working on, along with the money that was apportioned for those projects, he'd also be picking a public fight with the most respected official in all of New York.”

Claim: A mayor who accepted Robert Moses's resignation risked losing completion of Moses's ongoing projects and their allocated funding.

“But behind that joke was real fear. If a mayor accepted that resignation, not only would he be forfeiting the completion of whatever projects Moses was working on, along with the money that was apportioned for those projects, he'd also be picking a public fight with the most respected official in all of New York.”

Claim: Accepting Robert Moses's resignation would also force a mayor into a public conflict with what the speaker describes as New York's most respected official.

“Maybe this is the most important thing, just sheer stubbornness.”

Claim: The speaker suggests that sheer stubbornness may be the most important thing.

“Maybe this is the most important thing, just sheer stubbornness.”

Claim: The speaker suggests that sheer stubbornness may have been the most important factor.

“Moses had spent years befriending the owners of the city's newspapers. He spent many weekends at the summer home of the Sulzbergers, which is the family that owns the New York Times.”

Claim: Robert Moses cultivated relationships with New York City newspaper owners, including the Sulzberger family, owners of The New York Times.

“The mayor knew that if Moses resigned, the next morning, all the front pages would tell the same story, about how a man above politics was driven out by a craven politician because he refused to compromise the city's interests.”

Claim: The mayor believed that Robert Moses’s resignation would prompt newspapers to portray Moses as a principled public servant forced out by a self-serving politician for defending the city’s interests.

“And the power that Moses derived from his popularity with the masses was nothing compared to the power that he derived from his connections with New York's powerful private interests.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s connections to powerful private interests in New York gave him far more power than his popularity with the public did.

“We are very used today to NIMBY, not in my backyard, where powerful but concentrated interest groups manage to stymie projects despite their raw popularity.”

Claim: The speaker says that concentrated, powerful interest groups can block projects even when those projects are broadly popular.

“Moses built a concentrated faction for YIMBY, yes in my backyard. He built a graft machine that ensured that the most powerful people in the state would all benefit when new construction happened.”

Claim: Robert Moses assembled a pro-construction political faction by creating a patronage system that gave powerful people in the state benefits from new construction.

“The banks got to buy his bonds at a steep discount without competitive bidding, the unions got more jobs, politically connected lawyers got legal fees, and party bosses got paid to broker insurance policies to bridges that had no plausible risk of falling down.”

Claim: Robert Moses’s construction system distributed benefits to banks, unions, politically connected lawyers, and party bosses, including discounted bond purchases without competitive bidding, jobs, legal fees, and payments for brokering unnecessary bridge insurance.

“Moses could then rely on these beneficiaries to call up anyone who stood in the way of one of his projects, whether that was a borough president or the governor himself.”

Claim: Robert Moses could mobilize the beneficiaries of his projects to pressure officials who obstructed them, including borough presidents and the governor.

“Caro paints Moses as somebody who began as an idealist rather than somebody who craved power from the very start. In the 1910s, Moses was a brilliant young reformer who joined this new good government movement, which was trying to replace Tammany Hall's patronage with honest and competent administration.”

Claim: Robert Caro portrays Robert Moses as an idealistic reformer in the 1910s who joined the good-government movement to replace Tammany Hall’s patronage system with honest, competent administration, rather than as someone who sought power from the outset.

“He spent years fighting this machine, but his reforms got killed. The machine won, and Moses learned that ideals are useless without the power to realize them.”

Claim: After his reforms were defeated in years of fighting the political machine, Robert Moses concluded that ideals are useless without the power to implement them.

“Caro writes, quote, "In the beginning, and for decades of his career, the power Robert Moses amassed was the servant of the streets, amassed for their sake, so that his gigantic city-shaping visions could become reality.”

Claim: Robert Caro writes that for the early decades of Robert Moses’s career, Moses amassed power to serve the public and realize his large-scale visions for the city.

“But power is not an instrument that its possessor can use with impunity. It is a drug that creates in the user a need for larger and larger doses, and Moses was a user."”

Claim: Robert Caro characterizes power as addictive, creating a need for ever-greater amounts, and describes Robert Moses as addicted to it.

“Lyndon Johnson's story, on the other hand, is kind of the opposite. Through most of his career, there's little evidence that he had a coherent political ideology. He was a ruthless power seeker who embraced whatever happened to be the most expedient thing to do at that time.”

Claim: The speaker says Lyndon Johnson showed little evidence of a coherent political ideology through most of his career and pursued power ruthlessly, adopting whatever course was most expedient at the time.

“When Johnson first entered the US Senate, he realized that the most powerful men there were the conservative Southern Dixiecrats, and the Johnson that they encountered was one who molded himself to their form.”

Claim: Upon entering the U.S. Senate, Lyndon Johnson recognized the influence of conservative Southern Dixiecrats and adapted himself to their political outlook.

“While writing Master of the Senate, volume three of his Johnson biographies, Caro interviewed former Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge. He asked Talmadge what impression he got from freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson about the proper relationship between white people and Black people. And now quoting Caro's recounting of this exchange, quote, "Master and servant. So I," Caro, "asked, 'Well, didn't Johnson have any sympathy for Blacks?”

Claim: In Robert Caro’s interview, Herman Talmadge recalled that freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson viewed the relationship between white and Black people as “master and servant.”

“And now quoting Caro's recounting of this exchange, quote, "Master and servant. So I," Caro, "asked, 'Well, didn't Johnson have any sympathy for Blacks? Any desire to improve their lot?' My notes say, long pause. And then I wrote Talmadge's two-word reply. None indicated. Another pause, and then, 'He was with us in his heart. I believed him. I believed him.'" End quote. Of course, we know that once he became president, Johnson spearheaded the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction.”

Claim: Herman Talmadge told Robert Caro that he saw no indication that Lyndon Johnson sympathized with Black people or wanted to improve their circumstances, and said Johnson was aligned with the white Southern senators “in his heart.”

“I believed him. I believed him.'" End quote. Of course, we know that once he became president, Johnson spearheaded the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction.”

Claim: As president, Lyndon Johnson led the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which the speaker describes as the most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction.

“So Moses began as a naive idealist, but in Caro's telling, became somebody seeking power for its own sake. Johnson, on the other hand, was an opportunist from the very start, and it was only once he had real power that he used it for ideals few knew that he had.”

Claim: The speaker contrasts Robert Moses, who Robert Caro portrays as moving from idealism to seeking power for its own sake, with Lyndon Johnson, whom the speaker portrays as an opportunist who used power for little-known ideals only after gaining it.

“Before he was president, Lyndon Johnson was vice president, and before he was vice president, Lyndon Johnson was in the Senate. And Lyndon Johnson was the most powerful Senate majority leader, perhaps the most powerful legislator, period, in the history of this country.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson was the most powerful Senate majority leader and perhaps the most powerful legislator in U.S. history.

“Here's Caro. Quote, "He was master of the Senate, master of an institution that had never before had a master, and that at the time almost half a century later, when this book is being written, has not had one since."”

Claim: Robert Caro writes that Lyndon Johnson became the Senate’s first masterful leader and that the Senate had no comparable leader again in the nearly half-century before Caro wrote his book.

“End quote. No leader before Johnson had wielded this kind of power because the Senate had deliberately been set up by the founders to not be led.”

Claim: The speaker says no earlier leader had wielded power like Lyndon Johnson because the founders designed the Senate to resist being led.

“When Johnson asked the Library of Congress for a list of the majority leader's formal powers, he found that there was exactly one, the right to be recognized first on the floor.”

Claim: The formal powers listed for the Senate majority leader when Lyndon Johnson consulted the Library of Congress consisted of only the right to be recognized first on the floor.

“Before Johnson, the majority leader was less a leader and more a lightning rod. He'd be blamed in the national press and in his home state for everything that the Senate failed to do, yet he had no actual power to do anything about those failures.”

Claim: Before Lyndon Johnson, the Senate majority leader was blamed publicly for the Senate’s failures despite lacking the power to remedy them.

“Being in this predicament was so politically toxic that Johnson's two predecessors as majority leaders had both lost their own Senate seats. A big part of the reason that Johnson became his party's leader at just 44 years old, in a Senate whose average age was around 60, was that hardly anybody else wanted this thankless and useless job.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson became Senate majority leader at age 44, in a Senate whose average age was about 60, partly because the role was so undesirable that his two predecessors had lost their seats and few others wanted it.

“And in their hands, the job would have remained useless. But they were not Lyndon Johnson. From this position, Johnson turned himself into the second most powerful person in America, right after the president, and he used three different tactics to do so.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson used three tactics to turn the Senate majority leader’s position into the second most powerful position in the United States, after the president.

“First, he gained leverage. He made sure that he had things to promise and things to threaten with. Johnson transformed the Senate's rules, institutions, and norms so that he alone had the power to grant important favors to his colleagues.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson gained leverage over senators by changing Senate rules, institutions, and norms to make himself the gatekeeper for important favors.

“If a senator needed a bill passed, Johnson was the one who could get it scheduled on the floor and persuade the committee chairman to report it out. And if the bill needed help in the House, Johnson was the one who had a direct line to Speaker Sam Rayburn.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson could help senators advance bills by scheduling floor consideration, persuading committee chairs to report them, and contacting House Speaker Sam Rayburn when House support was needed.

“And if the senator needed money for his next campaign so that he could make sure he remained a senator, Johnson was the one who could put in a good word with the oilmen from his native Texas.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson could help senators seeking campaign funds by recommending them to oilmen in Texas, his home state.

“Johnson also put himself in a position to control committee assignments, which are the single biggest factor that shapes how a senator's whole career plays out. For about a century, they had been handed out based on seniority.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson gained control over Senate committee assignments, which the speaker calls the biggest factor shaping a senator’s career; assignments had previously been based on seniority for about a century.

“Practically overnight, Johnson changed the system so that many seats were no longer being settled by seniority, but rather negotiated by the party's steering committee, which Johnson controlled.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson shifted many Senate committee assignments from seniority-based allocation to negotiation by the party steering committee, which he controlled.

“If you wanted a good seat, you had to do what Johnson wanted. In 1957, Estes Kefauver voted against Johnson on an important motion. That very same week, the highly coveted open seat on the Foreign Relations Committee, which Kefauver was expecting to get, was instead handed over to a far more junior senator named John F. Kennedy. The real political genius of Lyndon Johnson was identifying and then gaining control over every possible source of leverage over his colleagues.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson used control over committee assignments to reward or punish senators: after Estes Kefauver opposed him in 1957, a coveted Foreign Relations Committee seat expected by Kefauver went instead to the more junior John F. Kennedy.

“Kennedy. The real political genius of Lyndon Johnson was identifying and then gaining control over every possible source of leverage over his colleagues. Whatever a senator needed to survive, whether that was money, committee seats, or the passage of bills that mattered to his home state, Johnson could give and Johnson could withhold.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson sought control over all sources of leverage over senators and could grant or withhold campaign money, committee seats, and passage of bills important to their states.

“The second important tactic was setting the agenda. What is said by a bill that passes depends on which version actually comes up for a vote and with what final modifications.”

Claim: The outcome of legislation depends on which version of a bill is brought to a vote and what amendments or modifications are made before the vote.

“Whoever gets to set this agenda controls the outcome. So you won't be surprised by who put himself in this position. Johnson's main tool for controlling the agenda was the unanimous consent agreement.”

Claim: Control over the legislative agenda can determine outcomes, and Lyndon Johnson’s main tool for controlling the Senate agenda was the unanimous consent agreement.

“By default, Senate debate is unlimited. A senator can talk about a bill for as long as he likes, and as he does so, he can also offer amendments that have nothing to do with that bill, each of which can stall the bill even further.”

Claim: Senate rules ordinarily allow unlimited debate and unrelated amendments, either of which can delay a bill.

“A unanimous consent agreement sets those freedoms aside for a single bill. It fixes the allotted time for debate and constrains the opportunity to amend it.”

Claim: A Senate unanimous consent agreement limits debate time and amendment opportunities for a particular bill.

“Earlier leaders had rarely used such agreements, and even when they had, they'd only used them after weeks of debate on a bill that had already been exhausted in its deliberations.”

Claim: Before Lyndon Johnson, Senate leaders rarely used unanimous consent agreements and generally did so only after a bill had undergone weeks of debate.

“Johnson made their use the norm in the Senate. He wouldn't even allow a bill to reach a floor until such an agreement was in place. And the reason was that Johnson wanted to control which bills reached the floor and to keep the floor from changing anybody's mind, because he wanted every vote settled in private beforehand through the wheeling and dealing where his leverage worked best.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson normalized unanimous consent agreements and required one before a bill reached the Senate floor, enabling him to control the agenda and settle votes privately through bargaining before public debate could alter senators’ positions.

“The last thing he wanted was for a long public debate about the merits of some bill to change a senator's mind at the very last minute or for a surprise amendment to unravel a deal that he had spent weeks painstakingly brokering.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson sought to prevent public debate or surprise amendments from changing senators’ votes or disrupting deals he had negotiated in advance.

“As Senator Paul Douglas put it, under Johnson, all the actions take place offstage before the play begins. And the third tactic that Johnson employed was brokering all the deals to his advantage.”

Claim: Senator Paul Douglas characterized Lyndon Johnson’s Senate process as taking place behind the scenes before public proceedings began.

“Johnson made sure that as much of the Senate's information as possible ran through him. He had every committee assign a staffer to tell him what was being drafted. His aides tracked what every senator was up to.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson centralized Senate information by having committee staff report drafts to him and aides monitor senators’ activities.

“And he spent his own days in the cloakroom and in the hallways cajoling and listening to his colleagues. So he knew exactly what each senator really wanted and what he would and wouldn't give up to get it.”

Claim: By cajoling and listening to senators in the cloakroom and hallways, Lyndon Johnson learned what each senator wanted and what concessions each would make.

“In any session, the Senate faces hundreds of possible bills and amendments. A senator's vote on one bill can be traded for another senator's vote on a different one.”

Claim: Senators can trade votes across different bills, amid hundreds of possible bills and amendments in a session.

“And any single bill can be amended a dozen different ways to win somebody over. So there's almost an endless combination of possible deals to be made. Johnson made sure that he was the one instigating and brokering most of these deals.”

Claim: Because bills can be amended in many ways to attract support, Senate dealmaking has nearly endless possible combinations, and Lyndon Johnson positioned himself to initiate and broker most deals.

“As a result, he would be making sure that any deal left Johnson coming out ahead. A good example is how he got the Civil Rights Act of 1957 passed through the Senate.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson structured the deals he brokered to leave himself politically advantaged.

“Johnson was desperate to make sure that at least some civil rights bill passed that year, even if it was weak. That's because he wanted to become president, but no southerner with his record of consistently voting against civil rights could hope to win the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960.”

Claim: Lyndon Johnson sought passage of at least a weak civil rights bill in 1957 because he wanted to become president and believed his anti-civil-rights voting record would prevent a Southern candidate from winning the 1960 Democratic nomination.

“The problem was there seemed to be no bill strong enough to win the northern liberals, yet weak enough that the southerners wouldn't filibuster it. The sticking point was who would preside over the court cases where southern electoral officials were accused of suppressing black voters.”

Claim: In negotiations over the 1957 civil rights bill, lawmakers faced a conflict between satisfying Northern liberals and avoiding a Southern filibuster, centered on who would preside over cases involving alleged voter suppression by Southern officials.

“Southern senators insisted on jury trials, but northern senators were livid because in their view, this would gut the whole bill. The entire point of the law was to combat the exclusion of black citizens from the voting rolls.”

Claim: Southern senators demanded jury trials in the 1957 civil rights bill, while Northern senators argued that this would undermine its purpose of preventing Black citizens from being excluded from voter rolls.

“But southern states required jurors to be registered voters, and an all-white southern jury would never convict a white registrar for turning away black voters.”

Claim: Because Southern states required jurors to be registered voters, the speaker says an all-white Southern jury would not convict a white registrar for rejecting Black voters.

“And so any version that one side could accept, the other would reject. A less creative legislator would have backed down. But over the course of seven months, Johnson built a masterful deal that brought together wholly unrelated factions and whose byproduct included the passage of this civil rights law.”

Claim: Although the opposing sides rejected each other’s acceptable versions, Lyndon Johnson spent seven months assembling a deal among unrelated factions that helped pass the 1957 civil rights law.

“Western senators got a vote on a federal dam that they had wanted for years between Idaho and Oregon. Midwestern Republicans who had powerful railroad unions in their state got a right to a jury trial extended to striking workers.”

Claim: As part of Johnson’s 1957 legislative deal, Western senators received a vote on a long-sought federal dam between Idaho and Oregon, and Midwestern Republicans secured jury-trial rights for striking workers.

“And moderates got a clause guaranteeing that black citizens could serve on federal juries so that they could tell voters that they had created a new civil right. Meanwhile, the jury trial guarantee for southern election officials stayed in, which kept the bill weak enough that southerners agreed not to filibuster it.”

Claim: The 1957 civil rights deal gave moderates a provision allowing Black citizens to serve on federal juries while retaining jury trials for Southern election officials, which kept the bill weak enough to avert a Southern filibuster.

“A dam in Idaho and protections for union workers and federal jury rules had nothing to do with voting rights in the South, at least not to anyone who lacked the inside knowledge and political creativity of Lyndon Johnson.”

Claim: The provisions involving an Idaho dam, union-worker protections, and federal jury rules were unrelated to Southern voting rights, but Lyndon Johnson used political creativity and inside knowledge to connect them in a legislative deal.

“Caro's books are the best written accounts of how political power actually works. But they are written so compellingly and with characters more vivid and stories more gripping than any novel that it's very easy to get so engrossed that you just keep turning the pages and you never stop and ask yourself, what are the lessons these stories are teaching about power?”

Claim: The speaker says Robert Caro’s compelling prose, vivid characters, and gripping stories can engross readers so much that they overlook the books’ lessons about power.

“Caro's books are the best written accounts of how political power actually works. But they are written so compellingly and with characters more vivid and stories more gripping than any novel that it's very easy to get so engrossed that you just keep turning the pages and you never stop and ask yourself, what are the lessons these stories are teaching about power?”

Claim: The speaker considers Robert Caro’s books the best-written accounts of how political power works.

“I wanted to make this video essay both so that I could think through what these lessons actually are, but also so that you would have the context necessary to watch my interview with Caro and get as much out of it as I did.”

Claim: The speaker created the video essay to analyze the lessons about power in Caro’s books and to prepare viewers to get more from the speaker’s interview with Caro.